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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
MASTER AND SERVANT-DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR WILL
APPLY TO SERVANT USING AN AUt'OMATIC AIR HAAMER.
Fergusion v. Fulton Iron Works, 259 S. W. (Mo.) 811.
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, was engaged in chipping rough
metal projections from metal castings with an automatic air hammer con-
taining a chisel. While engaged in working with this apparatus, the hammer
vibrated, causing metal castings to fly out, thus injuring the sight of one
of plaintiff's eyes. Plaintiff seeks to recover on the doctrine of res Ipsa
loquitur.
The Court held that this doctrine would apply to this case, as the rule
of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked in master and servant cases when the
instrumentalities are peculiarly within the knowledge of the master, and
when the master is in a much better position to explain the cause of the
accident than the injured party.
MUNICIPAL CORPORAMIONS-LIABILITY TO CITIZENS THROUGH
NEGLIGENCE IN INSTALLATION OF SO-CALLED SAFETY DEVICE.
Mayor and Aldernen of Vicksburg vs. Harralson, 101 So. 713 (Miss. 1924).
Plaintiff seeks recovery for personal injuries received by him on account
of a severe "bumping" inflicted in driving an automobile over a "bumper".
This device was merely a convex portion of the pavement, five inches in
height and five feet wide at its base, and extending across the street on
which plaintiff was driving. Its purpose was to warn drivers of a blind
intersection just on the other side. The bumper complained oi was installed
only a few days before the plaintiff's injuries were sustained, and replaced
a former one known to have been dangerous. The former one was known
to plaintiff, and a sign warning of the traffic at the intersection and of the
bumper located at the side of the street, a reasonable distance preceding
the bumper.
As a result of driving over the bumper the plaintiff was thrown against
the steering wheel of his car in such a way that the impact caused an
Injury to his heart. He was driving at a moderate speed.
Held, an automobile driver Is not required to use extraordinary care
but may assume that the street Is reasonably safe for vehicular traffic, A
city is negligent In placing in its streets a dangerous device or obstruction
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which a reasonable driver is not sure to see even through momentary for-
getfulness or temporary distraction of attention. This is the case even
though the device is so located under the guise of a safety appliance. The
defendant's evidence of the use of similar devices by the United States
government in National parks was held not conclusive of their reasonable-
ness or practibility at an intersection of city streets. Judgment for plaintiff
affrmed.
STRIET RAILWAYS-FAILURE TO STOP AND GIVE POLICE PATROL
RIGHT OF WAY-ALLEGATION OF NEGLIGENCE IN PETITION.
Hogan vs. Fleming et Q., 265 S. W. 875.
This is an action by a police officer for personal injuries. Plaintiff was
riding in a patrol wagon, and due to a collision with a street car, was
severely injured. The street car failed to stop when the motorman caught
sight of the patrol wagon. There was a city ordinance requirina a street
car to come to a stop upon the approach of a fire appartus. but did not
mention police vehicles.
Held, that as there was a custom that cars should stop upon the ap-
proach of patrol wagons, the defendant was guilty of negligence. Defend-
ant claimed that plaintiff did not make out a case in the petition, as no
violation of the above custom was alleged. The court held that it was not
necessary, due to precedents of common law which gave policemen, firemen
and all kinds of public vehicles the right of way over other vehicles and
street cars. Judgment for laintiff.
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